

THE 2006 COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR CANADA

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INTRODUCTION¹

With the passing of the Cold War as the primary threat to international order, failed and fragile states have emerged as perhaps the greatest threat to international security and stability. Noted academics and policy makers alike have drawn attention to the complex relationships between state failure, poverty and terrorism. Michael Ignatieff (2002:115) characterizes weak and collapsing states as the chief source of human rights abuses in the post-Cold War world. James Wolfensohn (2002) calls for a global strategy that includes measures designed to address "... the root causes of terrorism: those of economic exclusion, poverty and under-development". Others note the mutually reinforcing nature of poverty and state failure: weak governments deprive groups within their country of the basic means of survival, even as the desperately poor are forced to engage in illicit activities, such as drug production, in order to survive. (West 2005)

Though the concept of state failure is relatively new, it has nonetheless established itself as an indispensable part of the international lexicon. Various characterized as difficult partners, (OECD 2001) difficult environments, (Moreno Torres and Anderson 2004) fragile states, (Goldstone *et al* 2000) Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), (World Bank 2002) poor performers, (Australia 2002) weak performers, (ADB 2004) failing and/or failed states, (Rotberg 2003) and countries at risk of instability, (UK 2005a) the phrase encompasses a number of partially overlapping, yet analytically distinct concepts regarding vulnerability. Recent research has begun to quantify some of the costs associated with total disengagement from fragile and failed states. For instance, Chauvet and Collier (2004) provide a calculation of costs associated

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¹Since 1997, staff of CIFP (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy) project have been working with the Canadian government, the private sector and NGOs on early warning research.

with failed states. Their analysis incorporates direct costs, such as investment in post-conflict reconstruction, as well as indirect costs associated with regional destabilisation, endemic poverty, disease and famine. Their results indicate that the total costs of state failure are prohibitive whether calculated at the national, regional, or global level.

Thus far, efforts at government-to-government collaboration on human security policy in regions dominated by fragile and failed states, however characterized, have been modest. The

Are failed and fragile states a security risk? Yes – in different ways.

1. They are a risk to their people because:
 - They lack capacity, resulting in a lack of basic security;
 - They lack governance, resulting in the inefficient and inequitable distribution of public goods; and
 - They lack control over violence within their territory, resulting in further division and weakness, and the diffusion of conflict from other jurisdictions.
2. Failed and Fragile States are vectors for transnational threats and global problems because:
 - They lack capacity to prevent the transmission of diseases such as avian flu;
 - They are unable to control the transmission of AIDS;
 - They host base-camps for transnational criminal networks;
 - Their weak border control provides opportunities for human, drug trafficking, and other forms of smuggling; and
 - Their internal conflicts create refugee flows that upset the demographic balance of neighbouring states.
3. Failed and fragile states are regional and international risks because:
 - They are more likely to engage in risky behaviour in violation of international laws, rules and principles;
 - They provide support for the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction;
 - They engage in hostile interactions with their neighbours;
 - Their weakness attracts foreign intervention; and
 - Their diaspora groups may become conduits of conflict diffusion and contagion.


human security agenda has encompassed a broad range of issues but remains at the periphery of most states' core concerns. Issue-based approaches to human security provide no real sense of priority or an appreciation of what matters most. The consequences of the failure to develop and apply a comprehensive approach to human security are clearly visible. The majority of sub-Saharan African states have only limited capacity and authority to effectively address threats to individuals. These efforts are consistently undermined by a host of domestic political and governance factors, armed conflict, weak international linkages, demographic instability, poor economic growth, environmental degradation, and low human development. If they are to have any significance, human security policies require a multifaceted analysis and an appreciation of the relative risks that exist within and between states. Small arms, child soldiers, human trafficking, and land mines are important in themselves but they are symptoms, not causes, of fundamental structural problems.

As one part of a broader effort to enable more effective international engagement in failed and fragile states, this article fulfills three related objectives. First, it presents the initial results of the Fragile States Monitoring and Assessment Project undertaken by Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP). The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) contracted CIFP to develop a

number of wide-ranging tools that encompass, among other things, the monitoring, forecasting, and evaluation of failed and fragile states, as well as the assessment of supporting policies intended to address the development, security, and economic challenges they represent. The following diagram outlines the full extent of the CIFP analytical framework – known as the CIFP Net Assessment (CNA) – identifying the various modules involved in the analysis.

This article focuses on aspects of the CNA related to the structural assessment of fragile states. The results include a detailed and multi-dimensional ranking of the most fragile states in the world today, and provide a basis for policy regarding resource allocation and priorities for CIDA, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), and the Department of National Defence (DND) as they struggle to allot finite resources among the many countries in need of assistance. More generally, this article identifies the states most likely to require broad international engagement in coming years, information of crucial importance to START and DND as they outline long range procurement and recruitment strategies. The article also identifies countries that require further in-depth monitoring, a task to be accomplished using the event-monitoring capability that CIPF has developed as a separate component of the CNA framework.

Figure 1



Second, the article presents a methodology for evaluating individual country performance. This drill-down capability provides guidance to programming officers at CIDA and other government departments working in complex and fragile environments. It enables them to focus efforts and resources on the root structural causes of fragility rather than the outward symptoms of the problem, while simultaneously identifying areas of comparative strength within the state that may provide valuable points of entry for international development efforts. At the same time, it allows them to avoid decisions likely to further destabilize the country through otherwise unforeseen consequences of programming activities.

Third, the article presents initial statistical research results regarding the nature of the relationship between state fragility and selected key variables. The findings presented here, though merely a first cut, nonetheless provide some insight into the varied causes of state fragility, and identify several important avenues requiring further study. Such research is particularly relevant, given that the now broadly acknowledged lack of progress toward global attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is, to a certain extent, explained through the poor performance of the world's fragile and failed states. (Branchflower *et al* 2004)

DEFINING FRAGILITY AND FAILURE

State fragility and state failure tend to defy simple definition. Though the view that failure and conflict go hand-in-hand is predominant, it is not the only one. Rotberg, (2003) for example, characterizes failed states as being marked by an inability to provide basic political goods, including human security and security of the state, dispute resolution and norm regulation, essential political freedoms, and economic opportunity to most, if not all, of the population. Capturing the diversity of failed state environments, Jean-Germain Gros (1996) specifies a detailed taxonomy of five different failed state types: chaotic, phantom, anaemic, captured, and aborted. The various types derive their dysfunction from different sources, both internal and external, and require different policy prescriptions as a result. A French government report characterizes “fragile state” as a negative term, one denoting poor economic performance, a lack of effective government, or a deficiency in realizing the MDGs. (Châtaigner and Gaulme 2005)

The OECD defines fragile states as “countries where there is a lack of political commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies”. (Morcos 2005) The British Department for International Development (DfID) focuses on states in which “the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor”. (UK 2005b) For its part, the German Government describes failed and failing states as being “... characterized by a gradual collapse of state structures and a lack of good governance”. (Germany 2004)

CIFP’s analysis of state fragility begins with the understanding that, to function effectively, any state must exhibit three fundamental properties: authority, legitimacy, and capacity. These terms are explored in further detail below. Evidence of weakness or strength along any of these dimensions may have significant implications for the overall stability of a given country, requiring or enabling specific types of engagement by international donors. CIFP evaluates state

performance along each of these dimensions, providing policy makers with a robust assessment tool that is more policy relevant than any mono-dimensional list of fragile states could be.

Are conflict and failure related? Sometimes, often indirectly.

1. When properly channelled, non-violent conflict is a normal facet of political and social life in all states.
2. Organized large-scale violence on the other hand is present in many fragile states, though it is often a symptom of fragility rather than a cause.
3. Violent conflict is too narrow a lens through which to understand why states become fragile and why some fail. It is one facet of the much broader phenomenon of state fragility.
4. Violence is a poor trigger for international response. By the time it does erupt, it is usually too late to respond effectively except through costly operational responses such as military intervention.

OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

An initial examination of the resulting fragile state indices (see table 2) suggests that many of the most fragile are in Africa. However, that distribution becomes less definitive as one examines specific results along the dimensions of authority, legitimacy, and capacity (see table 3). African states predominate among those facing the greatest challenges in capacity; Haiti is the

only non-African state among the top twenty. The states with significant gaps in authority and legitimacy are a more diverse group. Afghanistan, Belarus, Haiti, Nepal, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Yemen all appear among the twenty states with the greatest problems of legitimacy. Although this is not equivalent to saying that such states are illegitimate,

it is a finding that reflects the problems created in these states by unstable governance, a lack of human security, poor human rights records, opaque government, and/or high levels of gender inequality. In terms of authority, Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, and others join African states such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Sudan on the list of states facing the gravest challenges to state authority. With governments in these states unable to exercise full control over their own territory, they continue to experience high levels of violence within their borders; many face active and violent insurgencies.

Such findings do not accord well with recent trends toward allocating aid on the basis of state performance. Indeed, McGillivray (2005) shows that fragile states are under-aided even when taking their limited absorptive capacity into account. Similarly, using the poverty-efficient allocation benchmark developed by Collier and Dollar, Levin and Dollar (2005) find that fragile states receive at least 40 percent less aid than their levels of poverty; population; and policy effectiveness, as measured by the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), would justify. Even when taking donor responses to rapidly changing situations into account, aid flows to fragile states are nearly twice as volatile as to other developing nations. Levin and Dollar also highlight the growing presence of aid “darlings” and “orphans” among fragile and failed states, whereby the darlings – generally nations emerging from conflict or otherwise considered strategically important – receive far more aid than one would otherwise expect. The orphans – typically very large or very small countries, or those considered strategically insignificant – receive comparably smaller amounts of aid. (Levin and Dollar 2005) Only through a more strategic approach to aid allocation can the international community begin to reverse these trends.

THE INDEX

This section presents the initial results of CIPP’s state fragility index. The current analysis uses data from more than 70 indicators that have been selected from an initial list of more than 100, with indicators selected on the basis of their relation to state fragility and their level of country coverage. State fragility is defined as the extent to which a state can or cannot provide the basic functions of governance to its population. Broadly understood, good governance also refers to the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups that play important roles within a state; accordingly, measures for these elements also appear within the index. Ultimately however, it is the presence or absence of a functional government that distinguishes functional from fragile and failed states. Given this fact, state performance forms the heart of CIPP’s fragility index. State weakness in any of the areas of authority, legitimacy and capacity (ALC) is a cause for concern, with implications for both the stability of the country

Table 1: Fragility Index Scoring Scale

Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others
Highest 5%	Country among worst global performers



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
and the approach development partners must take when working to strengthen the state and its institutions.

In addition to the assessment of a state's relative levels of ALC, each country profile includes a cluster-based summary of state performance. Cluster areas include governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, and environment.²

Evaluating "Stateness" – ALC

Obviously, authority, legitimacy, and capacity are analytical constructs, reflecting the functions of a state and its component parts. The three dimensions are inextricably interlinked; for instance, authority correlates with legitimacy at 0.58 and with capacity at 0.62, while legitimacy and capacity correlate at 0.75. As a result, shortfalls in any one dimension have implications for a given state's functionality along the other two, thus providing additional insight into the overall fragility of the state. The results of the ALC assessment not only indicate the presence of weakness, they provide some indication of the source and extent of that weakness, thus assisting policy makers in the initial decision to engage and in subsequent discussions regarding the form that engagement should take.

Figure 2



Authority

Any functional state must possess the ability to enact binding legislation over its population. Further, that state must be able to provide a stable and secure environment to its citizens and communities. This security is a necessary prerequisite to the realisation of public, private, and civil society interests. States lacking in authority may be unable to exercise control over the full extent of their legal territory; such states will have difficulty responding effectively to security threats, whether internal or external. In some areas, non-state actors, such as rebel militias or criminal organizations, may possess *de facto* authority; in others, the rule of law may be completely absent. Border control may be intermittent or non-existent, enabling illicit flows of people and goods. State response to foreign incursions may be weak and ineffective. Other potential problems include the inability to: enforce government policy; combat corruption and criminality; effectively mobilize the resources of the state towards the ends requested and required by government; regulate private markets; or guarantee contracts.

² Differences in shading among scores that are similar or identical are due to the fact that the darkest shade is given to the highest 5 percent in each cluster column so that a score in one column could have a darker (or lighter) shade than one in another column.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy refers to the ability of a state to command public loyalty to the governing regime, and to generate domestic support for that government's legislation and policy. Such support must be created through a voluntary and reciprocal arrangement of effective governance and citizenship founded upon principles of government selection and succession that are recognized both locally and internationally. States in which the ruling regime lacks either broad and voluntary domestic support or general international recognition suffer a lack of legitimacy. Such states face significant difficulties in maintaining peaceful relations between and among various communities within the state; any security that exists is likely the result of coercion rather than popular consent. As a result, such states are inherently vulnerable to internal upheaval and are likely to remain fragile so long as legitimacy remains wanting.

Capacity

Capacity refers to the power of a state to mobilize public resources towards productive ends. States with a satisfactory level of capacity display a basic competence in political and economic management and administration, with governments capable of regulating domestic affairs and conducting international transactions. They also possess the basic infrastructure required of a modern state, including functional transportation and communication networks. States lacking in capacity may prove unable to respond effectively to sudden shocks such as natural disasters, epidemics, food shortages, or refugee flows. They may therefore be heavily reliant upon civil society and the international community in times of crisis.

Initial Findings

Table 2 presents a list of the 40 most fragile states as calculated by the CIFP fragility index. For each state, the table includes the net fragility score, ALC scores, cluster scores, and the score for the crosscutting theme of gender.³ Table 3 provides a list of the 20 most fragile states within the categories of authority, legitimacy, and capacity. The results in Table 3 provide clear evidence of the multifaceted nature of state fragility. While some states display weakness along virtually all dimensions, the situation for most is more complex, with states exhibiting elements of both stability and fragility. In this context, stability refers to a state's ability to function effectively, providing essential public goods to its population.

On the basis of the fragility index, one may not only identify broad patterns of relative strength or weakness within a state, but drill down into detailed country profiles to identify the factors driving those observations. This drill-down capability in turn assists in programming decisions and identifies areas or trends of concern that require further monitoring. Ultimately, the results in tables 2 and 3 provide an important validation of the ALC framework, demonstrating its ability to capture a breadth and depth of state performance beyond that of any single indicator matrix.

The approach represents an advance in the field of structural fragility assessment. Earlier frameworks put forward by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and DfID were instrumental in bringing discussions of state fragility to the forefront of international discourse. For instance, USAID roots its approach in the assumption that fragile and failed states

³ CIFP includes gender indicators in calculations of all clusters when information is available. For example, measures of female employment factor into the economic score, while female political representation factors into the governance score. These varied gender scores are also averaged to produce an aggregate gender score that cuts across all clusters.

are a threat to individual nations' national security and the international order. (US 2005) Conversely, the approach favoured by DfID is grounded in the development literature, and is most concerned with the significant challenge that fragile and failed states pose to efforts to alleviate poverty and to achieve the MDGs. These insights have been combined with CIPF's refined methodology and analytical rigour to produce the current ALC framework.

Table 2: The 40 Most Fragile States

Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores				Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C	Gender		Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography	Environment
Burundi	8.25	8.04	7.58	8.65	7.42	7.18	8.08	9.17	8.89	7.25	8.00	
Congo (Kinshasa) ⁴	8.11	7.93	7.58	8.49	7.72	7.67	6.93	9.15	9.70	7.35	5.47	
Afghanistan	7.89	9.06	8.42	6.68	..	9.56	6.00	9.53	7.78	7.57	4.33	
Somalia	7.86	7.53	8.41	7.82	..	8.90	8.42	7.18	8.51	7.34	7.13	
Liberia	7.84	6.18	8.82	8.64	8.52	9.22	7.58	7.20	8.91	6.78	5.40	
Chad	7.81	6.79	8.13	8.43	9.33	7.96	7.04	6.89	9.83	7.57	4.87	
Ethiopia	7.81	7.58	7.14	8.31	7.47	6.59	7.44	8.07	8.83	8.35	6.40	
Cote d'Ivoire	7.79	7.74	7.89	7.79	8.51	7.83	7.09	7.46	8.64	8.15	6.40	
Eritrea	7.73	7.04	7.91	8.14	7.00	6.93	7.45	7.68	9.02	7.49	6.07	
Angola	7.73	7.98	7.66	7.55	6.62	7.62	7.21	7.88	9.28	7.58	4.00	
Haiti	7.72	6.81	8.53	7.94	7.27	8.32	7.24	8.05	7.95	6.90	7.67	
Kenya	7.60	7.46	7.68	7.66	8.60	7.32	7.25	6.98	8.40	8.30	6.67	
Rwanda	7.55	6.27	7.47	8.51	6.42	6.93	6.74	6.47	8.69	8.43	8.20	
Zimbabwe	7.54	6.77	8.33	7.76	7.62	7.49	8.21	6.79	8.40	6.05	6.27	
Guinea-Bissau	7.52	6.66	7.42	8.25	8.38	6.93	8.11	5.43	8.60	8.40	4.67	
Sierra Leone	7.50	6.55	7.22	8.46	7.60	7.38	8.18	5.70	8.46	7.33	6.00	
Congo (Brazzaville)	7.49	6.70	7.57	8.02	7.06	7.68	7.47	6.69	8.17	8.23	4.20	
Sudan	7.48	7.83	7.58	7.21	7.82	7.13	6.38	9.22	8.22	6.95	6.00	
West Bank/Gaza	7.41	6.69	10.33	7.50	8.30	6.85	9.08	8.16	4.78	7.00	9.00	
Nepal	7.37	6.58	7.76	7.71	7.42	7.63	6.69	8.28	7.73	7.34	6.00	
Nigeria	7.33	7.19	7.46	7.37	7.64	7.19	6.65	7.02	8.08	8.30	6.67	
Niger	7.28	5.61	7.09	8.63	9.07	6.92	7.58	3.22	9.16	7.70	6.67	
Yemen	7.27	6.59	8.32	7.31	8.93	8.00	6.56	7.44	7.20	7.63	8.33	
Uganda	7.24	7.38	6.50	7.51	5.33	6.51	6.11	7.38	8.27	8.95	6.67	
Central African Rep.	7.17	5.47	8.19	7.97	8.33	7.91	7.49	4.96	8.58	7.23	2.67	
Mauritania	7.16	5.99	7.81	7.69	9.34	7.64	6.89	5.67	8.23	6.68	6.93	

⁴ Congo (Kinshasa) is also referred to as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Table 2 continued

Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores				Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C	Gender		Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography	Environment
Guinea	7.15	5.97	7.56	7.92	7.40	7.40	7.36	4.87	8.94	6.90	4.93	
Burkina Faso	7.00	5.50	6.39	8.28	7.90	5.61	7.16	3.25	8.94	8.40	5.00	
Iraq	6.94	7.52	7.50	6.15	6.42	7.60	7.80	9.38	5.53	6.30	4.33	
Tanzania	6.90	6.48	6.14	7.61	6.74	5.99	6.23	5.85	9.16	7.28	5.33	
Malawi	6.89	5.87	6.29	7.90	7.42	5.78	7.84	3.52	8.45	8.43	7.00	
Togo	6.83	5.50	7.54	7.48	8.17	7.56	6.56	4.26	8.21	6.98	6.33	
Pakistan	6.82	7.08	6.43	6.83	6.11	6.47	6.01	8.58	6.44	7.34	6.73	
Madagascar	6.81	5.06	7.24	7.83	7.94	6.68	6.88	4.89	8.15	7.74	5.00	
Mozambique	6.79	5.53	6.12	8.05	6.80	5.05	7.23	5.05	9.20	7.15	3.67	
Myanmar (Burma)	6.79	6.96	7.15	6.47	6.25	6.75	6.96	8.81	6.75	5.20	4.73	
Bangladesh	6.77	6.25	7.68	6.72	7.76	8.25	5.77	7.68	6.48	7.03	4.33	
Cameroon	6.77	6.02	7.06	7.23	6.60	7.28	6.52	5.56	7.81	7.48	4.33	
Mali	6.76	5.40	6.34	8.01	9.02	5.73	7.13	4.14	9.34	7.20	4.33	
Laos	6.67	5.83	7.05	7.15	6.16	5.93	7.11	6.41	7.14	7.00	3.67	

Tables 3 and 4 clarify the diverse challenges faced by various fragile states. A number of sub-Saharan African nations face serious problems arising from limited capacity. Some countries – including Mozambique, Mali, and several others that perform relatively well in areas of authority and legitimacy – face significant challenges in terms of state capacity. Others, such as Colombia and Sri Lanka, score poorly in the area of authority as a result of the security challenges they face, but perform relatively well in measures of capacity and legitimacy. Still others, such as Belarus, demonstrate problems with government legitimacy even as they continue to maintain some degree of state authority and capacity. Similarly, certain countries face particular challenges in specific cluster areas. For instance, despite the presence of reliable governing institutions and robust economic development, many small states, particularly island nations such as St. Lucia, exhibit high levels of environmental stress.⁵ While all these countries may benefit from assistance provided by members of the international community, the nature of that assistance and its method of delivery clearly will vary widely in each case. Taken together, such findings illuminate not only the challenges faced by these fragile states, but provide points of entry, highlighting areas of relative strength ripe for further international investment.

⁵ St. Lucia provides a good example of one such sub-class: the small island developing states (SIDS) that tend to face a number of structural obstacles not found in other types of developing states. For a broader discussion of the topic, see Carment *et al* (2006).

Table 3: Twenty Most Fragile States, by ALC Component

Authority		Legitimacy		Capacity	
Afghanistan	9.06	West Bank and Gaza	10.33	Burundi	8.65
Burundi	8.04	Liberia	8.82	Liberia	8.64
Angola	7.98	Haiti	8.53	Niger	8.63
Congo (Kinshasa)	7.93	Afghanistan	8.42	Rwanda	8.51
Sudan	7.83	Somalia	8.41	Congo (Kinshasa)	8.49
Cote d'Ivoire	7.74	Zimbabwe	8.33	Sierra Leone	8.46
Ethiopia	7.58	Yemen	8.32	Chad	8.43
Somalia	7.53	Swaziland	8.23	Ethiopia	8.31
Iraq	7.52	Central African Republic	8.19	Burkina Faso	8.28
Kenya	7.46	Chad	8.13	Guinea-Bissau	8.25
Uganda	7.38	Eritrea	7.91	Eritrea	8.14
Colombia	7.26	Cote d'Ivoire	7.89	Mozambique	8.05
Nigeria	7.19	Equatorial Guinea	7.82	Congo (Brazzaville)	8.02
Indonesia	7.19	Belarus	7.82	Mali	8.01
Pakistan	7.08	Mauritania	7.81	Central African Republic	7.97
Eritrea	7.04	Nepal	7.76	Haiti	7.94
Iran	7.00	Kenya	7.68	Guinea	7.92
Myanmar (Burma)	6.96	Bangladesh	7.68	Malawi	7.90
Sri Lanka	6.95	Angola	7.66	Comoros	7.86
Haiti	6.81	Congo (Kinshasa)	7.58	Madagascar	7.83

Table 3 presents the twenty most fragile states in terms of ALC. While a number of states appear on more than one list, only three – the DRC, Eritrea, and Haiti – appear on all three. This intriguing fact underscores the variety of ways in which states exhibit fragility, and demonstrates the utility of the ALC methodology in isolating and clarifying those varied experiences. These three states face challenges unlike those of other developing countries, with each requiring a unique approach to development, one capable of addressing the variety of challenges facing the state.

States that appear on one or two of the lists also face particular challenges that require carefully tailored policy approaches. International engagement in Iraq, Colombia, or Sri Lanka obviously must take careful note of the volatile security situations in each country. Conversely, international development programs in states such as Mali, Mozambique, and Chad must make government capacity and human development a priority, aside from any considerations of security. Though all are in some ways fragile, all require distinct and strategic policy approaches. Among its 25 development partners, the Canadian government is arguably taking a lead role in developing such policies in concert with their domestic partners. To do so effectively, it must continue with the strategic coordination efforts embodied in START and a number of other government mechanisms, allocating resources and implementing policy on the basis of sound structural risk analysis and in-depth monitoring of the type developed in the present CIFP-CIDA collaboration.

Table 4 provides a more detailed analysis of state performance, breaking down results by cluster. Again the diversity between and within lists is notable, reinforcing the point that no single index captures the full measurement of state performance. No country appears on all six lists, or even on five. While a number of countries appear on two or three lists, only a few – including Ethiopia, Somalia, and Burundi – appear on four. The information provided by the CIFP assessment methodology identifies the particular challenges faced by each country listed in tables 3 and 4, providing information to policy makers attempting to engage these states effectively. To cite just one example, Yemen is among the 20 most fragile states in terms of its legitimacy gap. It is also among the top 20 states in terms of governance, demography, and environment. Clearly, any development program that does not take into account all these areas of state weakness faces diminished prospects for success, as does a program that correctly identifies these underlying sources of fragility, but lacks the resources to adequately address them. Simply put, policy makers must consider both the sources of fragility and the true costs associated with an effective strategy when crafting an engagement program; to do otherwise is to invite an ineffective, possibly destabilizing policy.

Table 4: Twenty Most Fragile States, by Indicator Cluster

Governance		Economics		Security and Crime	
Afghanistan	9.56	West Bank and Gaza	9.08	Afghanistan	9.53
Liberia	9.22	Somalia	8.42	Iraq	9.38
Somalia	8.90	Zimbabwe	8.21	Sudan	9.22
Haiti	8.32	Sierra Leone	8.18	Burundi	9.17
Bangladesh	8.25	Guinea-Bissau	8.11	Congo (Kinshasa)	9.15
Tonga	8.08	Burundi	8.08	Myanmar (Burma)	8.81
Saudi Arabia	8.03	Solomon Islands	7.98	Russia	8.65
Yemen	8.00	Malawi	7.84	Sri Lanka	8.62
Chad	7.96	Iraq	7.80	Pakistan	8.58
Central African Republic	7.91	Zambia	7.63	Iran	8.51
Brunei Darussalam	7.83	Comoros	7.61	Colombia	8.35
Cote d'Ivoire	7.83	Liberia	7.58	Philippines	8.31
Azerbaijan	7.82	Niger	7.58	Nepal	8.28
Lebanon	7.78	Central African Republic	7.49	West Bank and Gaza	8.16
Tajikistan	7.70	Congo (Brazzaville)	7.47	Indonesia	8.11
Congo (Brazzaville)	7.68	Eritrea	7.45	Ethiopia	8.07
Congo (Kinshasa)	7.67	Ethiopia	7.44	Haiti	8.05
Mauritania	7.64	East Timor	7.44	Angola	7.88
Kazakhstan	7.64	Guinea	7.36	Azerbaijan	7.81
Iran	7.63	Kenya	7.25	Turkey	7.77

Table 4 continued

Human Development		Demography		Environment	
Chad	9.83	Uganda	8.95	Saint Lucia	9.20
Congo (Kinshasa)	9.70	Malawi	8.43	West Bank and Gaza	9.00
Mali	9.34	Rwanda	8.43	Andorra	9.00
Angola	9.28	Burkina Faso	8.40	Bahrain	9.00
Mozambique	9.20	Guinea-Bissau	8.40	Qatar	9.00
Niger	9.16	Ethiopia	8.35	Malta	9.00
Tanzania	9.16	Kenya	8.30	Yemen	8.33
Eritrea	9.02	Nigeria	8.30	Rwanda	8.20
Guinea	8.94	Congo (Brazzaville)	8.23	Burundi	8.00
Burkina Faso	8.94	Cote d'Ivoire	8.15	St Vincent/ the Grenadines	7.70
Liberia	8.91	Ghana	7.90	Comoros	7.67
Burundi	8.89	Equatorial Guinea	7.90	Haiti	7.67
Ethiopia	8.83	Madagascar	7.74	Dominica	7.50
Rwanda	8.69	Niger	7.70	Somalia	7.13
Cote d'Ivoire	8.64	Yemen	7.63	Lebanon	7.07
Guinea-Bissau	8.60	Angola	7.58	Malawi	7.00
Central African Rep ^l ic	8.58	Chad	7.57	El Salvador	7.00
Gambia	8.52	Afghanistan	7.57	Sri Lanka	7.00
Somalia	8.51	Cape Verde	7.51	Bahamas	7.00
Sierra Leone	8.46	Eritrea	7.49	Ghana	6.93

POLICY CHALLENGES

Structural data analysis is only the beginning. The following diagrams outline the larger role of CFP's fragile state analysis in government policy-making cycles. As the previous discussion makes clear, the ALC approach allows CFP to identify and clarify key strengths and weaknesses of states in which Canada chooses to engage. The structural ALC analysis forms only one element of a much larger assessment framework. The full CNA includes event monitoring and Delphic consultation of expert opinion, as well as an assessment of potential policy relevance and effectiveness. Integrated into government decision-making processes, these elements combine to provide a rich informational resource to policy officers across all government departments.

Perhaps even more significant than the support that the CNA provides to any individual department is the role it plays in facilitating whole-of-government policy making at the strategic level. Current international best practice in fragile states places particular emphasis on the need for fully integrated and long-term analysis and engagement in fragile states. (Prest *et al* 2005) To be effective, government policy must be coordinated across all relevant departments. Moreover, that policy must be informed by timely and comprehensive risk assessment. Only through such analysis and coordination will policy makers overcome the obstacles that have historically impeded engagement.

Figure 3




Figure 4




Table 5 provides results for CIDA’s 25 development partners, as well as the five fragility states that CIDA has committed to support. Table 6 provides a similar assessment of countries CIPF has identified as ideal candidates for stabilization and reconstruction. Collectively, the countries represent an extremely diverse group both geographically and in terms of country performance; it is not mere rhetoric to say that the challenges facing Bolivia (a CIDA development partner) are worlds apart from those confronting the DRC or Sri Lanka. Individually however these countries are good choices because of the presence of bilateral aid programmes, a long history of positive relations with Canada and a willingness to undertake peacebuilding efforts. Thus our framework enables all elements of the Canadian government to target the root causes of destabilization, in order to more effectively assist those countries coming back from the brink.

Table 5: CIDA Development Priorities

Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography
CIDA Development Partners											
The Americas											
Honduras	6.25	6.00	6.60	6.26	5.89	6.69	6.11	6.38	6.46	5.48	5.53
Nicaragua	5.94	5.07	6.12	6.47	5.53	5.94	6.48	4.62	6.31	6.33	5.00
Bolivia	5.86	5.68	5.91	5.98	4.77	6.32	6.46	5.87	5.34	6.00	3.07
Guyana	5.00	5.39	5.08	4.69	5.44	4.73	5.99	4.01	5.14	4.90	2.33
Asia											
Pakistan	6.82	7.08	6.43	6.83	6.11	6.47	6.01	8.58	6.44	7.34	6.73
Bangladesh	6.77	6.25	7.68	6.72	7.76	8.25	5.77	7.68	6.48	7.03	4.33
Indonesia	6.36	7.19	6.05	5.89	5.18	6.54	6.45	8.11	5.11	6.08	5.67
Cambodia	6.35	5.59	6.37	6.85	5.46	6.96	5.52	6.27	7.40	6.35	4.00
Sri Lanka	6.06	6.95	5.83	5.48	6.00	6.05	6.03	8.62	4.25	5.20	7.00
Viet Nam	5.60	5.75	5.45	5.57	3.45	5.41	5.28	6.07	5.78	5.97	4.40
Eastern Europe											
Ukraine	5.60	6.07	7.17	4.53	6.54	7.53	6.00	7.05	4.19	3.40	3.00
Sub-Saharan Africa											
Ethiopia	7.81	7.58	7.14	8.31	7.47	6.59	7.44	8.07	8.83	8.35	6.40
Kenya	7.60	7.46	7.68	7.66	8.60	7.32	7.25	6.98	8.40	8.30	6.67
Rwanda	7.55	6.27	7.47	8.51	6.42	6.93	6.74	6.47	8.69	8.43	8.20
Niger	7.28	5.61	7.09	8.63	9.07	6.92	7.58	3.22	9.16	7.70	6.67
Burkina Faso	7.00	5.50	6.39	8.28	7.90	5.61	7.16	3.25	8.94	8.40	5.00
Tanzania	6.90	6.48	6.14	7.61	6.74	5.99	6.23	5.85	9.16	7.28	5.33
Malawi	6.89	5.87	6.29	7.90	7.42	5.78	7.84	3.52	8.45	8.43	7.00
Mozambique	6.79	5.53	6.12	8.05	6.80	5.05	7.23	5.05	9.20	7.15	3.67
Cameroon	6.77	6.02	7.06	7.23	6.60	7.28	6.52	5.56	7.81	7.48	4.33
Mali	6.76	5.40	6.34	8.01	9.02	5.73	7.13	4.14	9.34	7.20	4.33
Zambia	6.65	5.31	6.54	7.79	7.82	6.57	7.63	3.56	8.44	6.70	5.00
Benin	6.53	5.00	6.38	7.63	8.25	5.52	6.63	3.36	8.36	6.93	5.60
Senegal	6.49	5.74	6.13	7.23	7.57	5.70	6.29	5.41	8.19	6.75	4.60
Ghana	6.47	5.65	5.61	7.50	8.20	5.32	6.67	3.75	8.26	7.90	6.93

Table 5 continued

Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography
CIDA-funded Fragile States											
Afghanistan	7.89	9.06	8.42	6.68	..	9.56	6.00	9.53	7.78	7.57	4.33
Haiti	7.72	6.81	8.53	7.94	7.27	8.32	7.24	8.05	7.95	6.90	7.67
Sudan	7.48	7.83	7.58	7.21	7.82	7.13	6.38	9.22	8.22	6.95	6.00
West Bank/Gaza	7.41	6.69	10.33	7.50	8.30	6.85	9.08	8.16	4.78	7.00	9.00
Iraq	6.94	7.52	7.50	6.15	6.42	7.60	7.80	9.38	5.53	6.30	4.33

Table 6: Potential Stabilization and Reconstruction Candidates

Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography
First Tier											
Congo (Kinshasa)	8.11	7.93	7.58	8.49	7.72	7.67	6.93	9.15	9.70	7.35	5.47
Uganda	7.24	7.38	6.50	7.51	5.33	6.51	6.11	7.38	8.27	8.95	6.67
Pakistan	6.82	7.08	6.43	6.83	6.11	6.47	6.01	8.58	6.44	7.34	6.73
Indonesia	6.36	7.19	6.05	5.89	5.18	6.54	6.45	8.11	5.11	6.08	5.67
Colombia	6.21	7.26	6.24	5.45	5.32	6.35	6.18	8.35	5.42	4.93	5.00
Second Tier											
Yemen	7.27	6.59	8.32	7.31	8.93	8.00	6.56	7.44	7.20	7.63	8.33
Guatemala	6.45	5.78	6.87	6.70	6.70	7.22	5.68	5.90	6.95	6.86	6.47
Sri Lanka	6.06	6.95	5.83	5.48	6.00	6.05	6.03	8.62	4.25	5.20	7.00
Kyrgyzstan	5.75	5.44	6.98	5.48	7.48	7.57	6.98	4.81	4.40	5.43	3.33

Table 6 continued

Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography

Western Balkans

Bosnia & Herzegovina	5.40	5.90	6.80	4.44	6.95	7.53	5.21	6.54	3.48	5.58	3.93
Croatia	4.63	5.31	5.22	3.87	5.23	5.64	5.03	5.94	3.42	3.50	2.33
Slovenia	3.50	3.59	3.80	3.30	4.24	4.35	3.90	3.87	2.40	3.05	3.67

Regional analyses in Table 7 highlight complications arising from regional instability. Such analyses are crucial if Canada is to realize the greatest possible impact in its areas of engagement. One need only think of Western Africa or the Great Lakes region to see how the most determined efforts by the international community in a given country may be overwhelmed by instability in its neighbours. Many sources of instability – including refugee flows, environmental threats, epidemics, drought, famine, and transnational crime – tend to have regional or even global dimensions. Regional profiles provide some measure of these effects; others are analyzed through CIFP's relevance and impact assessments, further elements of the overall CNA framework. These modules seek to identify the potential consequences of fragility and failure regionally and globally, as well as from Canadian priorities, while simultaneously identifying the extent to which Canada can have a positive impact upon the state in question through its policies and programming. Such information enables decision-makers to better understand both the potential for action and the consequences of inaction, providing a practical vehicle for information sharing, which in turn enables better coordination. Related to the issue of regional dimensions of fragility is the question of assessing the impact of current and potential international actors on fragile state development. Any attempt to analyze Canadian and international contributions to stabilization efforts in a given fragile state must consider the role played by other state governments, as well as any powerful non-state group operating inside the borders, whether that role contributes to the goals of state stability and poverty alleviation, or not. Though measures of international involvement in fragile states do appear in the fragility index, such complex issues require greater analytical depth than can be provided by structural analysis. As a result, the CIFP net assessment includes a qualitative analysis of the role played by key stakeholders, both domestic and external, critically appraising the extent to which their involvement may complement or potentially undermine efforts sponsored by the Canadian government in the country.

Table 7: Regional Profiles

Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography
Central Asia											
Afghanistan	7.89	9.06	8.42	6.68	..	9.56	6.00	9.53	7.78	7.57	4.33
Pakistan	6.82	7.08	6.43	6.83	6.11	6.47	6.01	8.58	6.44	7.34	6.73
Uzbekistan	6.00	5.61	7.45	5.69	6.44	7.47	6.72	6.51	4.72	5.45	4.67
Tajikistan	5.85	5.14	7.50	5.77	6.06	7.70	6.83	5.22	4.75	5.45	4.33
Kyrgyzstan	5.75	5.44	6.98	5.48	7.48	7.57	6.98	4.81	4.40	5.43	3.33
Turkmenistan	5.42	4.86	6.93	5.10	4.40	6.54	6.05	5.84	4.33	4.38	3.67
Great Lakes Region											
Burundi	8.25	8.04	7.58	8.65	7.42	7.18	8.08	9.17	8.89	7.25	8.00
Congo (Kinshasa)	8.11	7.93	7.58	8.49	7.72	7.67	6.93	9.15	9.70	7.35	5.47
Rwanda	7.55	6.27	7.47	8.51	6.42	6.93	6.74	6.47	8.69	8.43	8.20
Sudan	7.48	7.83	7.58	7.21	7.82	7.13	6.38	9.22	8.22	6.95	6.00
Uganda	7.24	7.38	6.50	7.51	5.33	6.51	6.11	7.38	8.27	8.95	6.67
South East Africa											
Zimbabwe	7.54	6.77	8.33	7.76	7.62	7.49	8.21	6.79	8.40	6.05	6.27
Mozambique	6.79	5.53	6.12	8.05	6.80	5.05	7.23	5.05	9.20	7.15	3.67
Zambia	6.65	5.31	6.54	7.79	7.82	6.57	7.63	3.56	8.44	6.70	5.00
South Africa	5.66	5.92	5.16	5.72	6.16	4.32	5.91	5.57	6.42	5.93	5.07
The Balkans											
Serbia and Montenegro	6.00	6.67	6.16	5.28	6.95	6.75	6.25	7.75	5.39	3.79	2.33
Macedonia	5.51	5.65	6.74	4.80	6.52	6.87	6.13	6.55	3.55	4.35	4.33
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.40	5.90	6.80	4.44	6.95	7.53	5.21	6.54	3.48	5.58	3.93
Croatia	4.63	5.31	5.22	3.87	5.23	5.64	5.03	5.94	3.42	3.50	2.33
Slovenia	3.50	3.59	3.80	3.30	4.24	4.35	3.90	3.87	2.40	3.05	3.67

FURTHER APPLICATIONS

CIDA's current development strategy focuses a majority of its resources on a limited number of development partners. One immediate consequence of this shift in policy is an increased need for a robust evaluation capability. With greater resources allocated in each country where CIDA operates, there are increased expectations of visible and concrete returns on Canadian investment. Beyond contributions to broad strategic policy formulation and associated resource allocation choices, the fragility index may also hold promise as an effective tool for such policy and programme evaluation.

CIDA is currently implementing lessons identified in its *Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness* and the comprehensive model for development, which "... addresses the political, economic, social and institutional dimensions of development. It stresses the importance of getting governance right, the proper sequencing of reforms, the need for building capacity to ensure sustainability, and engaging civil society." (Canada 2002) In addition to being more comprehensive, CIDA has also undertaken efforts recently to focus its bilateral assistance in fewer countries and to be a significant donor in at least one, but no more than three sectors identified as priorities in their national poverty reduction strategies. (Canada 2005) If a development partner, chosen today on the basis of its ability to use development assistance effectively for poverty reduction, suffers setbacks in its authority, legitimacy and capacity, there are risks to the investments CIDA is making. If ALC indices are improving, the chances of sustainable broad-based growth are likely to be increasing. By monitoring ALC performance on an ongoing basis in addition to monitoring gains in education, health, and so on at the sector level, CIDA can assess the effects programming has not only on the sector in question, but on overall ALC-measured state functionality as well.

Finally, the fragility index provides some indication of the location and types of engagement that the Canadian government is likely to face in the medium to long term. CIFP's net assessment approach provides a framework through which other government departments can explore and identify opportunities for early investment in cooperation with CIDA to bolster waning ALC performance in order to prevent fragility, as well as to address situations of current fragility or imminent failure. In addition, even as the index provides guidance to CIDA, START, and other government agencies as they work to strengthen weak and vulnerable states, it has the potential to provide DND and other government agencies involved in long-term planning with information regarding how and where Canadian Forces and other government resources will be deployed in the future.

COUNTRY PROFILES

In addition to the broad comparative indices, CIFP also produces detailed assessments for each country in the fragility index. These country profiles enable users to drill down to the level of individual indicators, assisting efforts to assess performance in specific subject areas. The detailed reports provide insight into the nature of the particular risks facing a given country; it also highlights areas of relative strength – those areas ripe for increased investment. For instance, tables 8 and 9 provide detailed fragility profiles for Sri Lanka and Ghana. Both are designated CIDA development partners, while the latter is also among START's second tier

priority countries. While Sri Lanka has been engaged in a long-term civil conflict, Ghana continues to be perceived as a bastion of stability in an otherwise turbulent region. Accordingly, Sri Lanka exhibits weak authority, largely as a result of the decades-long confrontation between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government. Indicators related to political violence, organized crime, number of refugees produced, and other measures of security tend to reflect various destabilizing aspects of the conflict. Human development indicators suggest that the country is performing relatively well when compared to regional averages, with moderate levels of literacy, infant mortality, and HIV/AIDS infection, given the state’s overall level of economic development.

Ghana faces rather different challenges. Unlike Sri Lanka, Ghana has enjoyed an extended period of relative peace and stability. Despite its location in war-torn West Africa, Ghana thus far seems to be staying clear of the destructive conflicts that have entangled its neighbours. This fact is clearly reflected in its relatively low scores for virtually all measures of security and crime. In addition, its democratic institutions are relatively robust, with little history of political or human rights violations; all this contributes to legitimacy and authority scores far stronger than the regional average.

Table 8: Detailed Country Fragility Profile for Sri Lanka

		CIFP Fragility Profile				
		Fragility Index	A	L	C	Gender
		6.06	6.95	5.83	5.48	6.00
<p>Legend: ■ Asian Regional Average □ Sri Lanka</p>	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime			
	6.05	6.03	8.62			
	Human Development	Demography	Environment		Number of Indicators	
	4.25	5.20	7.00		71	
		Global Rank Score	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Indicator	Cluster Average
1. Governance						6.05
Permanence of Regime Type		2.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	
Level of Democracy		4.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	
Party financing		7.0	-1.0	1.0	7.0	

Table 8 continued

Number of Women Parliamentarians	6.0	0.0	1.0	7.0	
Percentage of Women Parliamentarians	8.4	-1.0	1.0	8.4	
Transparency of Government policymaking	4.5	1.0	2.0	7.5	
Independence of the judiciary	5.0	1.0	2.0	8.0	
Free press	6.4	-1.0	2.0	7.4	
Level of Corruption	5.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	
Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights	5.0	-1.0	1.0	5.0	
Participation in international political orgs	1.3	*	*	1.3	
Refugees hosted, IDPs, others of concern	8.0	-1.0	2.0	9.0	
2. Economics					6.03
Economic size	4.0	0.0	1.0	5.0	
Relative economic size (GDP per capita)	6.0	0.0	1.0	7.0	
Economic growth (GDP growth)	4.4	0.0	2.0	6.4	
Inflation	7.0	0.0	2.0	9.0	
Inequality Score (GINI Coefficient)	3.0	*	*	3.0	
Unemployment by sex (Female)	6.4	1.0	2.0	9.4	
Service reliability (Communications)	6.2	0.0	1.0	7.2	
Internet	7.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	
Informal Economy (Black market)	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Investment climate (Contract regulation)	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Standards of living (GNI per capita)	6.0	0.0	1.0	7.0	
Remittances (Relative)	2.2	0.0	1.0	3.2	
Reserve Holdings	4.6	0.0	1.0	5.6	
External Debt (Relative)	5.2	0.0	1.0	6.2	
Trade Openness (% GDP)	4.8	0.0	1.0	5.8	
Overall Unemployment	4.8	0.0	1.0	5.8	
Participation in international economic orgs	3.0	*	*	3.0	
FDI [Net inflows (% of GDP)]	6.6	0.0	1.0	7.6	
Foreign Aid (%GNI)	4.4	0.0	1.0	5.4	
3. Security & Crime					8.62
Political violence of civilians (incidents)	9.0	0.0	2.0	11.0	
Armed Conflict (intensity)	6.2	-1.0	1.0	6.2	
Political Stability	8.6	-1.0	1.0	8.6	
Number of Refugees Produced	7.0	0.0	2.0	9.0	
Risk of ethno-political rebellion	7.0	*	*	7.0	
Terrorism (Perception)	9.0	*	*	9.0	
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	7.8	0.0	2.0	9.8	
Political violence of civilians (fatalities)	8.5	0.0	2.0	10.5	
Organised crime	5.0	1.0	2.0	8.0	
Human Rights – empowerment	5.2	1.0	2.0	8.2	
Police force / law enforcement	5.0	1.0	2.0	8.0	
Legal system	5.0	1.0	2.0	8.0	
Human Rights – physical integrity	7.8	-1.0	2.0	8.8	

Table 8 continued

4. Human Development					4.25
Child malnourishment	6.0	*	0.0	6.0	
Bottom Quintile share of income	2.0	*	0.0	2.0	
Absolute poverty	5.0	*	0.0	5.0	
Literacy	4.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	
Literacy (Gender)	6.0	*	0.0	6.0	
Primary School Enrolment (Total)	
Primary School Enrolment (Girls)	
Access to Sanitation	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Health expenditure per capita	7.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	
Health infrastructure	
Health professionals	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Children in Labour Force (% of total 10-14)	2.2	-1.0	1.0	2.2	
Access to improved water	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Human Development Index	5.2	0.0	0.0	5.2	
Gender Development Index	5.2	-1.0	0.0	4.2	
AIDS New cases reported (total number)	3.2	0.0	0.0	3.2	
HIV/AIDS (Relative)	2.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	
HIV/AIDS (Gender)	1.0	*	*	1.0	
Infant mortality rates	3.2	0.0	1.0	4.2	
5. Demography					5.20
Population growth rates	4.2	-1.0	1.0	4.2	
Population density	8.4	**	**	8.4	
Population diversity (ethnic)	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Population diversity (religious)	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Youth Bulge (Pop. aged 0-14 as % of total)	3.0	-1.0	1.0	3.0	
Life expectancy (total)	3.4	-1.0	2.0	4.4	
Slum Population	5.0	*	0.0	5.0	
Urban Growth Rate (annual percentage)	5.6	0.0	0.0	5.6	
6. Environment					7.00
Deforestation	7.0	*	*	7.0	
Fresh water	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Arable/fertile land availability	8.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	


* Signifies that there is only a single observation available for the indicator, thus preventing trend and volatility analysis.

** Population density is exempt from trend analysis in this calculation because it increases almost without exception.

Table 9: Detailed Country Fragility Profile for Ghana

CIFP Fragility Profile					
Fragility Index	A	L	C	Gender	
	6.47	5.65	5.61	7.50	8.20
Governance	Economics	Security and Crime			
5.32	6.67	3.75			
Human Development	Demography	Environment		Number of Indicators	
8.26	7.90	6.93		69	
Global Rank Score	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Indicator	Cluster Average	
1. Governance					5.32
Permanence of Regime Type	7.5	0.0	2.0	9.5	
Level of Democracy	4.4	-1.0	0.0	3.4	
Party financing	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Number of Women Parliamentarians	4.5	-1.0	2.0	5.5	
Percentage of Women Parliamentarians	6.8	-1.0	2.0	7.8	
Transparency of Government policymaking	3.0	*	*	3.0	
Independence of the judiciary	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Free press	4.4	-1.0	2.0	5.4	
Level of Corruption	5.2	0.0	1.0	6.2	
Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights	3.6	-1.0	1.0	3.6	
Participation in international political orgs	1.0	*	*	1.0	
Refugees hosted, IDPs, others of concern	5.4	0.0	2.0	7.4	
2. Economics					
Economic size	5.8	0.0	1.0	6.8	
Relative economic size (GDP per capita)	7.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	
Economic growth (GDP growth)	3.6	0.0	0.0	3.6	
Inflation	8.8	1.0	2.0	11.8	
Inequality Score (GINI coefficient)	2.0	*	*	2.0	
Unemployment by sex (female)	
Service reliability (communications)	8.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	

■ SSA Regional Average
□ Ghana



Internet	8.3	0.0	0.0	8.3
Informal Economy (black market)	6.0	*	*	6.0
Investment climate (contract regulation)	5.0	*	*	5.0
Standards of living (GNI per capita)	7.0	0.0	1.0	8.0
Remittances (Relative)	6.8	0.0	0.0	6.8
Reserve Holdings	6.2	0.0	1.0	7.2
External Debt (Relative)	6.4	-1.0	1.0	6.4
Trade Openness (%GDP)	2.8	0.0	2.0	4.8
Overall Unemployment
Participation in international economic orgs	6.0	*	*	6.0
FDI [Net inflows (% of GDP)]	5.8	0.0	1.0	6.8
Foreign Aid (%GNI)	7.0	0.0	2.0	9.0
3. Security & Crime				3.75
Political violence of civilians (incidents)	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Armed Conflict (intensity)	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Political Stability	5.0	0.0	0.0	5.0
Number of Refugees Produced	4.4	0.0	1.0	5.4
Risk of ethno-political rebellion	5.0	*	*	5.0
Terrorism (Perception)	5.0	*	*	5.0
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	1.2	0.0	1.0	2.2
Political violence of civilians (fatalities)	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Organised crime
Human Rights – Empowerment	5.2	-1.0	2.0	6.2
Police force / law enforcement	5.0	*	*	5.0
Legal system	4.0	*	*	4.0
Human Rights – Physical Integrity	5.2	-1.0	0.0	4.2
4. Human Development				8.26
Child malnourishment	5.0	*	0.0	5.0
Bottom Quintile share of income	7.0	*	0.0	7.0
Absolute poverty	9.0	*	0.0	9.0
Literacy	6.8	-1.0	2.0	7.8
Literacy (gender)	..	*	0.0	..
Primary School Enrolment (total)	8.2	0.0	2.0	10.2
Primary School Enrolment (girls)	8.2	0.0	2.0	10.2
Access to Sanitation	7.0	*	*	7.0
Health expenditure per capita	8.0	0.0	0.0	8.0

Health infrastructure
Health professionals	9.0	*	*	9.0
Children in Labour Force (% of age 10-14)	4.8	-1.0	1.0	4.8
Access to improved water	7.0	*	*	7.0
Human Development Index	7.2	1.0	2.0	10.2
Gender Development Index	7.0	0.0	2.0	9.0
AIDS - New cases reported (total number)	9.0	0.0	2.0	11.0
HIV/AIDS (Relative)	7.8	0.0	2.0	9.8
HIV/AIDS (Gender)	6.5	1.0	1.0	8.5
Infant mortality rates	7.0	-1.0	1.0	7.0
5. Demography				7.90
Population growth rates	6.4	-1.0	2.0	7.4
Population density	6.0	**	**	6.0
Population diversity (ethnic)	9.0	*	*	9.0
Population diversity (religious)	6.0	*	*	6.0
Youth Bulge (aged 0-14 as a % of total)	7.8	-1.0	2.0	8.8
Life expectancy (total)	7.0	1.0	2.0	10.0
Slum Population	8.0	*	0.0	8.0
Urban Growth Rate (annual percentage)	6.0	0.0	2.0	8.0
6. Environment				6.93
Deforestation	8.0	*	*	8.0
Fresh water	6.0	*	*	6.0
Arable/fertile land availability	4.8	0.0	2.0	6.8

* Signifies that there is only a single observation available for the indicator, thus preventing trend and volatility analysis.

**Population density is exempt from trend analysis in this calculation because it increases almost without exception.

Unfortunately, Ghana faces a range of other challenges related to capacity. Human development indicators for the country are extremely low, with trend-lines suggesting that they have in some cases declined in relative terms over the last five years. Literacy, school enrolment, infant mortality, and measures of poverty all suggest the severity of the developmental challenges facing the country. CIDA efforts to enhance Ghanaian development must therefore work to address these issues; fortunately, Ghana's high levels of authority and legitimacy suggest the country will continue to be an effective partner in development efforts, with the means and the willingness to maintain vital local ownership of international development programs. Obviously, such discussions serve only to identify some of the broad ways in which the fragility index might enable more nuanced and effective Canadian government policy. As with the comparative index, the detailed country profiles provide a tool both to guide and to evaluate government policy.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

This section considers possible causes and effects of state fragility, which in our view remains a relatively unknown field and one that requires further formal empirical analysis. The analysis undertaken in this section is based primarily on correlations observed from our dataset, which can serve as a basis for future inquiries. Notwithstanding certain previous efforts, such as those of the Political Instability Task Force, surprisingly few have attempted to create a complete and quantitatively testable theory of state fragility. As a result, proper policy responses to fragile states remain similarly elusive. To be sure, any effort to quantify and test hypotheses regarding state fragility and state failure faces formidable conceptual obstacles. Foremost is the lack of widely accepted definitions of fragility and failure. Fragility and failure are not equivalent to armed conflict. As a result, unlike studies of conflict, there is no single identifiable dependent variable to observe and quantify.

Given the myriad ways a state may weaken or fail, scholarship has tended to proceed through research into particular facets of the problem. Studies of subjects as diverse as systemic transformation, (Holm 1998; Rosh 1989; Ayoob 1996) organized violence, (Tilly 1978; Gurr 1970) ethnic conflict, (Horowitz 1985) poverty, (Luckham *et al* 2001) rational explanations of conflict, (Hirschleifer 2001; Fearon 1995) political and civil rights, (Fein 1995) democracy and democratization, (Regan and Henderson 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Vanhanen 1997; Rummel 1994) governance, (Huntington 1968; Alger 1998) institutional legitimacy, (Dearth 1996; Baker and Ausink 1996) economic growth, (Stedman 1996; Van de Walle 2001) economic and structural vulnerability, (Carment *et al* 2006) trade and globalization, (Kant [1795] 2003; Barbieri and Schneider 1999; Goldstone *et al* 2000; Reuveny 2000) modernization and development, (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1989) patterns of state decay, (Gros 1996; Wallensteen 1998; Lemarchand 1997) colonialism, (Alao 1999; Herbst 1996/7) individual inequality, (Muller 1985) class-based inequality, (Nairn 1977) suppression of minorities, (Azar 1990; Gurr 1993) intercommunal inequality, (Holsti 1996) conflict diffusion and contagion effects, (Lake and Rothchild 1998) gender issues, (Bond and Sherret 2005; Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez 2002) intra- and interstate security dilemma, (Posen 1993; Lipschutz and Crawford 1999) commodity dependence, (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Ross 2003) transnational crime, (Bruneau *et al* 2005) religious fundamentalism, (Fox and Sandler 2004) and environmental degradation, (Homer-Dixon 1994; Levy 1995) among others, have all contributed to our understanding of state stability and fragility.⁶ However, few have attempted to create and test more general theories exploring the interrelationships between multiple elements of the preceding list, or otherwise synthesize such findings into a comprehensive decision-support framework of use to policy makers. For instance, the complex relationship between poverty, conflict, and development remains problematic and incompletely understood. While some inroads have been made by authors such as Stewart and Fitzgerald (2000) and Collier *et al* (2003), too many policy makers continue to operate using simplistic formulations such as “poverty causes conflict” or “conflict causes poverty”, which clearly do not capture the full extent of the relationship.

⁶ Perhaps the most complete statement of the variety of problems posed by fragile states is found in the recent report of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN 2004: 14-16).

Table 10: Index Summary Statistics

Number of countries covered	190
Number of indicators	74
Average country coverage per indicator	150.4
Average number of indicators per country profile	60.6

State fragility in our dataset appears to be more fundamentally correlated with a lack of capacity than low levels of authority or legitimacy, with the full fragility index correlating with capacity at 0.94, as opposed to 0.83 and 0.84 for authority and legitimacy. Intuitively, such a result makes sense – questions of political will are moot in the face of insurmountable structural weakness.

Second, authority and legitimacy are moderately related to one another, correlating at 0.58. Both correlate more closely with the full index than each other. Authority in particular seems

Is lack of political will the real issue?

The reasons behind inaction in situations of state fragility and failure

1. The traditional governmental separation between analysis/intelligence and policy/operations;
2. The difficulty in planning multi-sectoral responses to problems with such complex causes;
3. The tendency for immediate crises to crowd out strategic consideration of future issues and potential problems;
4. The lack of a structured model for systematic, rather than ad hoc, early warning and risk analysis;
5. Deficiencies in the manner in which warnings are transmitted to decision-makers, and
6. The difficulty in deriving assessments of the operational implications of such warnings.

the most independent dimension of the three, correlating with capacity at just 0.62. Such findings suggest that certain states may be able to maintain relatively high levels of authority even in the absence of strong legitimacy or capacity. This interpretation would appear to be supported by the ability of certain regimes – such as North Korea and Zimbabwe – to maintain a measure of state control despite extremely limited resources and in the face of widespread international pressure. Such states present a particularly difficult challenge to international development agencies, given their governing regimes' apparent resistance to diplomatic and economic pressure.

Conversely, states with relatively strong legitimacy and capacity such as Colombia and Sri Lanka nonetheless remain unable to exercise

effective control over the full extent of their territory. The lack of authority in such states may undermine attempts to provide development assistance. Even if the government is willing and able to support, cooperate with, or take ownership of international development programs, such efforts may appear partisan and do nothing more than fuel the conflict. Aid programs in these countries must therefore take the lack of authority into account in their design and execution, or they may inadvertently deepen the conflict and further destabilize the region.

Table 11: Correlation of Selected Indicators to Fragility Index

	Fragility			
	Index	Authority	Legitimacy	Capacity
Absolute poverty (% of population living on less than \$1 a day: World Bank data from most recent year)	0.66	0.36	0.33	0.78
CIRI empowerment human rights index (2004)	-0.54	-0.48	-0.69	-0.38
CIRI physical integrity human rights index (2004)	-0.60	-0.73	-0.54	-0.41
Freedom House Press Freedom Index (2004)	0.65	0.55	0.81	0.50
Freedom House civil and political rights index (2003)	0.64	0.52	0.78	0.51
Fund for Peace failed state index (2006)	0.89	0.79	0.89	0.78
Gender development index (UNDP, 2003)	-0.91	-0.68	-0.75	-0.96
GDP per capita (WDI, 2003)	-0.85	-0.60	-0.86	-0.82
Gender empowerment measure (UNDP, 2003)	-0.82	-0.67	-0.86	-0.75
GINI (WDI, most recent year)	0.45	0.31	0.35	0.49
Human development index (UNDP, 2003)	-0.90	-0.63	-0.70	-0.95
Infant mortality (2003)	0.81	0.58	0.62	0.85
Military spending (% GDP, 2002)	0.24	0.24	0.30	0.17
Foreign aid per capita (OECD, 2004)	-0.08	-0.25	-0.09	0.07
Foreign aid as % GNI (OECD, 2004)	0.48	0.17	0.29	0.60
Political stability (WB Governance database, 2004)	-0.81	-0.83	-0.75	-0.64
Polity IV Democracy-Autocracy index (2003)	-0.47	-0.27	-0.67	-0.40
Square of Polity Democracy-Autocracy index (2003)	-0.72	-0.53	-0.70	-0.70
SIPRI armed conflict database	0.21	0.38	0.08	0.12
Slum Population (% total urban)	0.78	0.61	0.56	0.80
Trade openness (2002)	-0.29	-0.34	-0.16	-0.27
Youth Unemployment (2001)	0.30	0.28	0.41	0.19


Table 11 above presents correlation calculations between selected indicators and the fragility index (as well as the components of the latter, i.e., authority, legitimacy and capacity). Several points are immediately apparent. The UNDP's human development index (HDI) correlates with the CIPF fragility index at -0.90. As is the case with GDI, GEM, GDP per capita, CIRI's human rights indices, Polity IV's Democracy-Autocracy index, and several other measures, the negative correlation between HDI and the fragility index is expected. All such indicators score poor performance at the low end of their respective scales, whereas the fragility index scores fragility at the high end. Consequently, all such indicators should – and do – correlate negatively with the CIPF fragility index.

Infant mortality, GDP per capita, gender empowerment, the GDI, the World Bank's political stability index (PSI), and the Fund for Peace failed states index all correlate at greater than 0.8 (or -0.8 in certain cases, as discussed above). Some of these strong correlations are unsurprising. Indices such as the PSI and the Fund for Peace both represent attempts to identify conditions of relative stability or fragility; one would therefore expect a high level of

convergence with the CIPF fragility index. Further, indicators such as low infant mortality and high GDP per capita have been previously identified with both stability and peace. Interestingly, some of the relationships between the indicators and state fragility appear to be non-linear. In the case of GDP per capita (see scatter plot below), for instance, the greatest returns to increasing mean income levels occur at lower income levels, with the returns to stability appearing to diminish as per capita GDP increases further.

A similar relationship is observed for infant mortality: state fragility appears to decline precipitously as infant mortality approaches zero; at higher levels, marginal reductions in infant mortality appear to have a less decisive effect. Naturally such observations may be mitigated following more rigorous statistical analysis; nonetheless, they point to important avenues of further inquiry. The strong correlation between gender empowerment and stability suggests that gender parity may indeed play a strong and measurable role in the stability of the state beyond that of general development. Income inequality (as measured by GINI coefficients) and fragility are not as strongly correlated as the relationships discussed above.

Figure 5



The correlation between fragility and regime type proves somewhat more complex. Though they clearly exhibit a relationship of some type, it is not a linear one; indeed, the two correlate at -0.48 , far below the level observed for development indicators. Given that the square of Polity IV's regime index correlates with fragility at -0.72 , the relationship may resemble the inverted 'U' relationship that various writers have observed between conflict – both civil and international – and regime type. Though there is some correlation between fragility aid flows as a percentage of GNI, there is virtually no relationship between fragility and

aid per capita. The former correlates with the fragility index at 0.48, while the latter correlates at -0.08. The fact that fragile states receive less aid per capita than more stable developing countries must be noteworthy to members of the OECD DAC that are actively working to address the challenges represented by fragile states and aid orphans.

CONCLUSION

This article serves several important purposes. First, it establishes the utility of the ALC approach to fragile state assessment. CIFP's dynamic and multifaceted methodology provides a level of information and insight beyond that provided by existing approaches. Second, it presents important initial findings regarding fragile state performance globally, both in comparison to other countries, and in more in-depth country fragility profiles. Third, the article provides initial results arising from research into the fundamental causes of state fragility. Some of the results, such as the close relationship between state stability and human development, gender empowerment, and per capita income, provide evidence to support a number of the Canadian government's core policies. Other results represent potential challenges to Canada's foreign and development policy. For instance, should results regarding complex relationships between fragility and democracy, and levels of aid survive subsequent testing, they may force many to re-examine their fundamental assumptions regarding development and foreign policy in fragile states.

With respect to CIFP's fragile states project, next steps include the further development and operationalization of its event monitoring and program assessment capabilities. The event monitoring capability provides policy makers with vital information on the emerging trends in countries and regions of concern to the Canadian government, enabling more dynamic and responsive policy decisions. The program assessment methodology assists policy officers in their efforts to maximize the impact of Canadian programming in fragile state environments, providing guidance in both the initial program formation and subsequent evaluative phases. At the end of its first phase of funding, the project will have produced a suite of tools capable of providing support and guidance through all stages of government policy formation in areas of fragile states – from initial assessment, to monitoring, to policy formulation and evaluation.

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